SUMMARY OF TEBO’S AND DEBARY’S CASES…..

JOINT PRE-TRIAL STIPULATION

Plaintiff, Stacy Tebo, and Defendants, City of DeBary and Leo Daniel Parrott, pursuant to the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. 15) and the Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order filed November 16, 2017 [Doc. 26], submits the following as their Joint Final Pre-Trial Statement:

  1. Basis of federal jurisdiction:

This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

  1. Concise statement of the nature of the action:

The Plaintiff alleges in Claims One and Two sex discrimination and retaliation, respectively on the part of the City of DeBary, under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Claims Three and Four are claims for sex discrimination and retaliation under the Florida Civil Rights Act and are based on the same factual allegations. Claim Five is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an equal protection violation on the part of

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Leo Daniel Parrott, DeBary’s City Manager, during the relevant time period. The Defendants deny that the Plaintiff was subjected to discrimination or retaliation during her employment and that all employment actions they took were done for reasons unrelated to her sex or any claimed protected actions on her part.

  1. Brief, general Statement of each party’s case:

Plaintiff’s Statement:

Plaintiff Stacy Tebo (Tebo) was employed as the City Clerk of the City of DeBary for approximately ten years before she was terminated from her employment immediately subsequent to her having filed with the EEOC a letter complaining of the sex discrimination in the workplace and having been named a witness in another employee’s EEOC Charge of Discrimination. Over the five years she was supervised by City Manager Dan Parrott (“Parrott”), Tebo and other female employees were subjected to many sexist comments by Parrott and, until pushed to do so, Parrott refused to investigate complaints of sexual harassment made by other female employees. When Tebo complained to City Councilmembers about the sexist comments of Parrott and his refusal to investigate sexual harassment complaints, Parrott found out and told Tebo to stop complaining about him to councilmembers, she did.

Parrott’s decision to terminate Tebo was made just two days after she submitted to him her letter of complaint to the EEOC and less than two weeks after she was named in a co-worker’s EEOC Charge. Tebo asserts that she was terminated from her employment due to her gender and in retaliation for her complaints. She has suffered damages and seeks lost pay and benefits and compensatory damages for emotional distress.

Defendants’ Statement:

Defendant Leo Daniel Parrott (Parrott) was hired by the City of DeBary (DeBary) as its City Manager on February 8, 2010. The Plaintiff, Stacy Tebo, (Tebo) had been hired by the City DeBary as its City Clerk in April of 2005.

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Tebo was terminated effective May 17, 2015. She had been notified of her termination on April 17, 2015. Parrot set out the reasons for the Plaintiff’s termination in his letters of April 17, 2015 and April 24, 2015. In general terms, Tebo was fired as a result of a number of incidents of insubordination and acts of disloyalty.

Tebo’s insubordination and disloyalty were best exemplified by the efforts of Tebo to get Parrott fired. Parrott became aware, from various sources, that Tebo was going behind his back to City Council members to voice complaints about his performance as City Manager. During the Plaintiff’s October 2014, evaluation meeting, Parrott instructed Tebo, his subordinate, to desist from complaining about him to City Council members. Tebo admits that despite being a direct report to the City Manager, and having been warned by the City Manager to desist in her efforts to undermine his position, she nonetheless continued to complain to City Council members about his performance as City Manager.

Tebo also acknowledges encouraging other employees to complain about the City Manager. In fact, Tebo believes that her complaints about Parrott were successful, and were a contributing factor in his leaving his position with the City.

Parrott decided to terminate Tebo after receiving a report from then City Mayor, Clint Johnson, that following a City Council meeting. Tebo raised to him reasons for terminating Parrott’s employment and she opined as to how other council members might vote on that issue.

Another identified basis for her termination relates to a public records request by Barry Maguire. Though Tebo denies not providing Parrott with a complete set of documents as requested, Parrott’s belief that she had failed to do so resulted from his comparison of the e-mails she produced with those provided to him by Eric Frankton, the City’s IT person.

With regard to the e-mail account for City business that she created it in her own name, Parrott denies any knowledge of or authorization for the separate e-mail account.

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Tebo’s claim that she was discriminated against with regard to the terms of her employment are without basis. The Plaintiff’s hostile work environment is based on a hand-full of events and rather innocuous comments over a period of five years. This evidence, seven if true, hardly establishes a severe and pervasive abusive environment.

With respect to retaliation, her participation claim fails because her letter of March 15, 2015, was not a charge of discrimination. Thus, the Plaintiff did not engage in a statutorily protected activity prior to the decision being made to terminate her employment.

Tebo’s opposition claim fails because her letter of March 15, 2015 and subsequent EEOC charge, were not made to oppose discrimination, but were done with the intent to force the City Manager to resign/retire. Furthermore, her assertions of opposition regarding the pay study and her other complaints of discrimination are insufficient, or without an objective basis. Finally, the Plaintiff’s termination was unquestionably motivated by her efforts to undermine Parrott and force him out as City Manager. Thus, retaliation cannot be the “but for” cause of her termination.

The 42 U.S.C § 1983 claim against Parrott is barred by qualified immunity. Even if one were to incorrectly conclude that Parrott was motivated to fire the Plaintiff in retaliation for her complaints, that he was also motivated to fire the Plaintiff due to her efforts to force him out is indisputable. Thus, at minimum he had mixed motivations regarding her termination and qualified immunity therefore applies.

  1. A list of all exhibits to be offered at trial, noting any objections:

Plaintiff’s Exhibits:

See Exhibit List attached as 4A

Defendants’ Exhibits:

See Exhibit List attached as 4B.

  1. A list of all witnesses, including rebuttal and expert. Expert witnesses shall be labeled as such:

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Plaintiff’s Witnesses:

See Witness List attached as 5A

Defendants’ Witnesses:

See Witness List attached as 5B

  1. Expert witnesses:
  2. a) Plaintiff, Barry Grant, CPA.
  3. b) Defendant, Janet R. Thornton, Ph.D.
  4. Money damages

Plaintiff seeks lost wages and benefits from the time of her termination through trial, in addition to compensatory damages for the costs she has incurred related to her termination of employment and for the emotional distress and anguish she has suffered. Her expert witness has calculated her lost wages, benefits and other costs incurred as a result of losing her job and taking work in North Florida, through trial as follows:

Without Salary Adjustment: $193,197 for lost wages, lost benefits, and other monetary losses related to termination

With Salary Adjustment to same level as the males at her level:

$209,487 for lost wages, lost benefits, and other monetary losses related to termination

Her compensatory damages for emotional distress and anguish are not susceptible to computation and Plaintiff does not intend to offer a method of computation to the jury.

She also seeks reinstatement or front pay and benefits in lieu of reinstatement, which are for the Court not the jury to award.

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She also seeks attorney’s fees and costs, which are for the Court to award.

  1. b) The Defendant does not seek money damages.
  2. Depositions to be offered:
  3. a) Plaintiff
  1. b) Defendant
  1. A concise statement of those facts which are admitted and will require no proof at trial, together with any reservations directed to such admission.
  2. Parrott was hired by the City of DeBary as its City Manager on February 8, 2010.
  3. The Plaintiff, Stacy Tebo, had been hired by the City DeBary as its City Clerk in April of 2005. Tebo had been supervised and evaluated by the City’s Finance Director, James Sealbinder until 2010 when Parrott transferred her from under the Finance Director, to directly report to him as the City Manager.
  4. Tebo’s annual salary when Parrott was hired was $54,657.98, when she was terminated it was $69,910.10. Tebo’s evaluations by Parrott were favorable.
  5. Tebo was terminated effective May 17, 2015. She had been notified of her termination on April 17, 2015 and was on unpaid leave between those two dates.
  6. Parrot set out the reasons for the Plaintiff’s termination in his letters of April 17, 2015 and April 24, 2015.
  7. A concise statement of applicable principles of law on which there is agreement.

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  1. To prove a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a Title VII plaintiff must establish that: (1) she belonged to a protected group, (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic, (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and condition of her employment and create an abusive working environment, and (5) a basis exists for holding the employer liable. Trask v. Secretary, Department of Verans Affairs, 822 F. 3d 1179, 1195 (11th Cir. 2016).
  2. If the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for discharge, the burden returns to the charging party to show pretext. An employee may show pretext by pointing to the weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, and contradictions in the employer’s rationale. Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055-56 (11th Cir. 2012).
  3. When considering whether an employee’s termination based on alleged misconduct was merely a pretext, the proper inquiry is whether the employer believed that the employee was guilty of misconduct and whether that belief was the reason for the employee’s discharge. Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F. 2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991).
  4. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the employee must demonstrate “the following essential elements: (1) the employee was engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Furcron v. Mail Centers Plus, LLC, 843 F. 3d 1295, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
  5. Title VII case law applies equally to claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developments, Inc., 610 F. 3d 1253, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010).
  6. A concise statement of those issues of fact which remain to be litigated.
  7. Whether the Plaintiff was discriminated against on the account of her gender.

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  1. Whether Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment.
  2. Whether the Plaintiff engaged in a statutorily protected activity and, if so, whether she was retaliated against as result.
  3. Whether the Defendants have articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions taken against the Plaintiff.
  4. Whether the reasons articulated by the Defendants were false and that discrimination or retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment actions.
  5. Whether the Plaintiff has suffered any damages and, if so, how much.
  6. A concise statement of those issues of law which remain for determination by the Court:
  7. Whether the Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to set out a prima facie case of hostile work environment.
  8. Whether the Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to set out a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation.
  9. Whether the Defendants have articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions taken against the Plaintiff.
  10. Whether the decision-makers with regard to the imposition of adverse employment action against the Plaintiff had a reasonable good faith basis for same.
  11. Whether the jury could find that the Plaintiff engaged the statutorily protected activity and, if so, was such activity the but for cause of the adverse employment action taken by the Defendant.
  12. Whether the Plaintiff has introduced substantial credible evidence that a jury could find that the Defendant’s articulated reasons

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for the adverse employment actions were both false and that discrimination and/or retaliation was the real reason.

  1. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to reinstatement to employment with DeBary or front pay in lieu of reinstatement and, if so, in what amount.
  2. A concise statement of any disagreement as to the application of the Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

None known.

  1. A list of all motions or other matters which require action by the Court:
  2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 11, 2018;
  3. Defendants’ anticipated Motion in Limine to be filed no later than July 27, 2018; and
  4. Plaintiff’s anticipated Motion in Limine to be filed by July 27, 2018.

Dated: July 20, 2018.

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